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Increasing citizen participation in policy decision-making is one of 
the most striking trends of 21st century Latin America. Almost every 
country in the region has institutionalized mechanisms for increasing 
citizens’ voice in issues surrounding development policies, local and 
regional budgeting decisions, and the performance of their elected 
officials. The institutions that are emerging—called participatory 
institutions—are varied in form and in function. For example, in Brazil 
hundreds of cities undertake participatory budgeting processes every 
year. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa created a Council of Citizen Participa-
tion and Social Control (Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control 
Social)—called the “fourth branch of power”—which serves as a trans-
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 parency and oversight mechanism for every level of government. Peru’s 
1993 Constitution gives citizens the right to recall elected officials in 
order to hold them accountable. These are just a few of the hundreds 
of examples of participatory institutions that now exist in the region. 
Scholars discuss these participatory institutions in terms of two broad 
(and overlapping) “processes” (Mansuri and Rao 2013, Wampler and 
McNulty 2011). First, some have emerged from the bottom-up, are 
mostly promoted by local actors, and are more flexible and context-
specific. The participatory budgeting experience that takes place in 
Brazil, begun by civil society activists and elected officials from the 
Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre, Brazil—which has been replicated 
around the world—is a good example of a bottom-up process.2 Others 
are mostly top-down in nature. They are mandated by national elected 
officials through constitutional reforms and legislative packages that 
provide blueprints for institutional processes that exist in all munici-
palities and/or intermediate governments. An example is Peru’s 2002 
Participatory Budgeting Law, passed by Congress, which mandates 
participatory budgeting in all cities and states in the entire country 
(McNulty 2012). Of course, this distinction, while analytically useful, 
is blurred in practice. Brazil’s participatory budgeting processes were 
facilitated by a participatory constitution, passed in 1988 and often 
called the “citizen’s constitution” (Avritzer 2009). And, Peru’s top 
down participatory budgeting law was promoted in Congress by former 
mayors from towns who had implemented local processes (McNulty 
2011). However, it is useful to distinguish processes that are mostly 
top-down in nature to begin to identify some of the factors that explain 
the emergence and outcomes associated with these wide reaching and 
mandated institutions. 
At least eleven countries in Latin America have mandated participatory 
institutions from above in an effort to increase citizen participation 
in politics. This article is about one—Guatemala’s top-down efforts 
to mandate citizen participation in development policy decisions. As 
Guatemala slowly emerged from its thirty-six year civil war, national 
reformers created an interesting yet under-studied participatory ins-
titution—the Urban and Rural Development Council System. These 
councils are made up of civil society representatives who make decisions 
about and oversee development project spending and development 
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policies. On paper, councils exist at the community, municipal, de-
partmental, regional, and national levels of government. In practice, 
their existence and implementation varies greatly around the country. 
This article explores several aspects of this system, such as the institu-
tional design of the council system, the origins of this design, and the 
system’s effectiveness in achieving its goals. Much of the data stem 
from my 2011 fieldwork in Guatemala, where I conducted 30 inter-
views with scholars, activists, elected government officials, members of 
community councils, and public policy experts. I also observed several 
council meetings at the community level. The paper argues that the 
system has engaged some actors but mostly failed to effectively chan-
nel interests and produce a participatory national development policy. 
This is mainly due to three factors: a complicated design, the legacy 
of military rule, and a political culture of clientelism and strongman 
politics (caudillismo). These findings serve to warn us that it may be 
more difficult to mandate citizen participation from above than many 
reformers currently assume. 
Two Phases of Institutional Design
The design of Guatemala’s council system emerged in two phases, both 
directly tied to the country’s 36-year civil war and genocide. While 
space does not permit a full discussion of the war, two aspects are im-
portant to note in light of the council system. First, it is important to 
recall the brutal nature of the violence in many rural areas. Guatemala’s 
Commission for Historical Clarification (1999) reports that: 
the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) registered 
a total of 42,275 victims, including men, women and children. 
Of these, 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 
were victims of forced disappearance. Eighty-three percent 
of fully identified victims were Mayan and seventeen percent 
were Ladino. The CEH has noted particularly serious cruelty 
in many acts committed by agents of the State, especially 
members of the Army, in their operations against Mayan 
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communities. The counterinsurgency strategy not only led to 
violations of basic human rights, but also to the fact that these 
crimes were committed with particular cruelty, with massacres 
representing their archetypal form. 
Second, it is important to understand that during this period the mili-
tary established a system for controlling the far reaches of the country 
called Inter-institutional Coordinators (IICs). Jennifer Schirmer des-
cribes these institutions well in her 1998 book The Guatemalan Mili-
tary Project. She notes that one of the key aspects of the Guatemalan 
military counterinsurgency project in the early 1980s was to undertake 
development projects in the already “massacred highlands” as well as 
“institutionalize the military’s permanent presence throughout the 
country” (1998, 65). Schirmer (1998, 65) continues: 
With the massacre campaign over, the military’s national strategy was 
now centered on the reorganization of production and rural life for 
security-qua-development purposes: in the military’s mind, to promo-
te forms of “modern production” and private ownership among the 
indigenous peasant population was a form of “insurance” against any 
future threats of insurgency.
The IICs became one of the main means toward achieving these goals 
(Schirmer 1998). Created in 1983 (Decree 772-83), the IIC system 
had four levels, including: 1) Committees of Local Development, with 
subcommittees that undertook work projects; 2) the Inter-Institutional 
Municipal Coordinator, led by the municipal military commander who 
would approve local work plans; 3) the Inter-Departmental Coordina-
tor; and 4) the International Coordinator, with representatives from 
most of the state agencies. These institutions would pave the way for 
the development council system.
Phase One: The Restricted Transition 
The first phase of institutionalizing the council system emerged during 
the democratization process in the 1980s. In response to the high levels 
of repression, Guatemalans began to mobilize in support of a more 
democratic regime (Reyes Illescas 1998). The military, realizing that 
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the international tide was also moving in this direction, called for a 
constitutional assembly and general elections in 1984. The Assembly 
passed a new constitution in 1985 and the Christian Democratic party, 
led by Vinicio Cerezo, won the national elections that same year. Thus, 
a restricted democratic period began. 
The transition to civilian rule is considered restricted because the left 
was not allowed to participate and the military played a very active role 
in all aspects of the transition. A former governmental official, active in 
the transition process, confirmed this in an interview when he recalled 
that the president told him privately that, after the transition “30% of 
the power lay in the military, 30% in the oligarchy, and 30% in all of the 
rest.” At the same time, the centrist Christian Democrats also realized 
that the military needed to be managed carefully. According to Jennifer 
Schirmer (1998, 188) the Christian Democrats never meant to “send 
the military to their barracks, but rather was very much committed to 
making them equal partners in a democratic project.” 
The development council system is outlined in the 1985 Constitution, 
which states that “for the organization and coordination of public 
administration, a National Council for Rural and Urban Development 
will be created, coordinated by the President of the Republic…These 
councils will be responsible for formulating urban and rural develop-
ment policies” (Article 225). It mentions the need for these councils 
at the national, regional, and departmental levels of government.
To clarify and expand on these provisions in the constitution, Congress 
passed the Law of Rural and Urban Development Councils (Ley de 
Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural, Decree 52-87) in September 
1987.3 Article 1 of the law states that the council system serves to de-
velop policy and “organize the participation of the population in the 
development of the country.” This law moves beyond the constitutional 
language by setting up a council system with five levels: national, re-
gional, departmental, municipal, and local. The development council 
system is set up like a pyramid structure (see Figure One) and is meant 
to channel policy decisions from the grass-roots level to the national 
level of government. Each level has the following membership: 
The National Council (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y Ru-
ral or CONADUR), is made up of the president (coordinator), vice 
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president, the Minister of Urban and Rural Development (MINDES 
in Spanish), who would serve as the executive director, representa-
tives from other ministries deemed important by the president, the 
person at the head of the State Planning Ministry (who would serve 
as secretary), regional coordinators, one mayor from each region, and 
one representative from several kinds of organizations (cooperatives, 
industrial, fishing, commercial and financial associations, labor, de-
velopment NGOs, San Carlos University, and private universities). 
The Regional Councils (Consejo Regional de Desarrollo or COREDES), 
made up of a regional coordinator (appointed by the president of the 
country), the governor from each department in the region, a mayor 
from each of the departments in the region, the head of the regional 
office of the national planning ministry (who would serve as secretary), 
the region’s representative from the Ministry of Urban and Rural De-
velopment, two representatives from the regional cooperatives, two 
representatives from the regional fishing, industrial, commercial and 
financial associations, representatives from the regional labor organi-
zations, and representatives from the regional development NGOs. 
The Department Councils (Consejo Departamental de Desarrollo or 
CODEDES) are led by the governor of the department and also in-
clude the mayors from each municipality in the department. Like the 
regional level, they also include the head of the departmental office 
of the National Planning Ministry (who would serve as secretary), a 
representative from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, 
two representatives from the departmental cooperatives, two repre-
sentatives from the departmental fishing, industrial, commercial and 
financial associations, representatives from the departmental labor 
organizations, representatives from the departmental development 
NGOs, and general secretaries of all registered political parties (who 
have voice but no vote). 
The Municipal Councils (Consejos Municipal or COMUDES) are 
made up of the mayor and the municipal corporation (like a city 
council). 
Finally, the Local Councils (Consejos Locales), which can be formed 
in communities with at least 250 adults, are made up of an assembly 
of neighbors and an executive committee. 
Stephanie L. McNulty
101
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
0
The law does not dictate any more details—such as the exact number 
of organizations that can be invited in each level of government—
beyond these parameters. Membership is left up to the leaders who 
would need to convene the council at the municipal, departmental, 
and regional levels.
After the law passed, the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development—
the agency in charge of implementing the council system—immedia-
tely set to work. In less than a year, 320 municipal councils and 850 
local councils were formed (Gibson nd). However, at the same time 
opposition to the system emerged. The most visible and vocal opposi-
tion came from the right wing led by Jorge Serrano, who had run against 
Cerezo and lost. Members of the opposition in Congress argued that a 
municipal council system with organized sectors of society was illegal 
as it reduced the municipal autonomy guaranteed in the constitution 
(Amaro 1990). At the same time, Serrano and other members of the 
opposition filed complaints about the constitutionality of the local 
development councils with the Constitutional Court.4 In May 1988, 
the court agreed with the opposition that the local tier of the system 
diminished municipal autonomy (Amaro 1990, Ramos Muñez and 
Sosa Velásquez 2010). The local level councils were banned and the 
system stayed in place with no local mechanism for channeling citizen 
policy preferences. 
Figure One: Guatemala’s Urban and Rural Development Council 
System5
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Most interviewees noted that the legalistic argument presented to 
the court reflected a more political concern about the system: the 
right-wing opposition feared that the development council system 
could be used as a way for the Christian Democrats to stay in power. 
Furthermore, there were other sources of opposition – the army and 
the left.6 Luis Linares López (2009, 12) describes the varied sources 
of opposition well in this passage:
the opposition to the development councils was fundamentally 
due to the connection with the social participation model 
that the Christian Democrats put forward in the 1960s and 
the assumption that they would be used by this party to stay 
in power. For the left, the councils were a new version of the 
Inter-institutional Coordinators, established by the military 
government in 1984 to coordinate the public administration 
for the counterinsurgency effort. For its part, the Army feared 
that the local councils would be co-opted by… the guerillas.
Thus, after the courts struck down the local level, the other levels re-
mained in place, but the council system had, as one interviewee noted, 
“no head” (due to the lack of elite support) “or feet” (the local level).
Phase Two: The Peace Accords
After the partial transition to democracy, the war dragged on. As peace 
began to emerge in neighboring countries, a peace process slowly gained 
momentum. In 1996, under the administration of Álvaro Arzú, the final 
peace accords were signed.7 During this time, new social actors, such 
as the indigenous and women, also started to gain a stronger voice in 
politics (Instituto Interuniversitario de Iberoamérica 2005). Many of 
the themes of the peace process and eventual peace accords included 
the need to revive participatory democratic institutions.8  
For example, the Agreement on Socio-Economic Aspects and the 
Agrarian Condition, signed in 1996, stressed the need for greater par-
ticipation in local development. Susanne Jonas (2000b, 78) writes of 
this agreement, “planning and implementation of development pro-
jects were to be decentralized through urban and rural ‘development 
councils,’ which would be reformed/reinvented from their past forms 
Stephanie L. McNulty
103
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
0
during the last 1980s.” Other agreements, such as the Agreement on 
the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples called for the reform 
of the Municipal Code to “to promote the participation of the indi-
genous communities in the decision-making process in all matters 
which affect them….” Finally, the Agreement on the Strengthening of 
Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic 
Society called for empowering municipal governments and the council 
system in general, and the revival of the local development council 
system specifically, in order to improve social participation. As such, 
the peace accords provided a new platform for reviving the withering 
council system.
Unfortunately, few of the promises in the accords were implemented. 
When Alfonso Portillo stepped into the executive office in 2000, a 
sense of dissatisfaction with the entire process had taken hold around 
the country. When several concrete reform proposals, approved by 
Congress, were put to a popular vote, 55% of the Guatemalan po-
pulation voted “no.” For many, this signaled the failure of the peace 
process (Holiday 2000). 
As a result, the council system continued to exist but remained 
relatively weak. It was given a push when the national government 
increased Guatemala’s Value Added Tax (VAT) from 7% to 10% (see 
Decree 142-1998). The additional 3% (called IVA-PAZ in Spanish), 
which later increased to 5%,9 are now destined towards funding reforms 
related to the peace process, and, partly, the infrastructure projects 
approved by the development council system (Puente Alcarez and 
Linares López 2004). Another change that took place as a result of the 
peace accords is the founding of the Presidential Secretary of Executive 
Coordination (Secretaria de Coordinación Ejecutiva de la Presidencia, 
or SCEP in Spanish), which replaced MINDES in formally overseeing 
the development council system.10
More recently Congress empowered the system even more as part of a 
reform trifecta. In 2002, Congress reformed the three most important 
laws related to both local government and citizen participation: the 
Municipal Code (Decree 12-2002),11 the Law of Urban and Rural De-
velopment Councils (Decree 11-2002 and its modifications 229-2003 
and 241-2003), and the Decentralization Law (Decree 14-2002). As an 
international donor report states, “[w]ith the approval of these laws, the 
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Guatemalan government formally honored some of the commitments 
acquired through the peace accords” (ICMA 2004, 4).
The Law of Urban and Rural Development Councils highlight two 
goals of the council system. First, it should “provide the principle 
means of participation to the population – Maya, Xinca, Garífuna 
and nonindigenous—in public management to achieve a democratic 
development planning process, taking into account the principles of 
national unity, multi-ethnicity, pluriculturalism and multilingualism 
of the Guatemalan nation” (Article 1). Second, it should “organize 
and coordinate public administration through the formulation of de-
velopment policies, plans and budget programs” (Article 3). The law 
reinstates the council system at five levels (replacing the “local” level 
with a “community “ level, now called COCODES), adding represen-
tatives from each of the indigenous groups in the particular region/
department/municipality as well as a representative from women’s 
organizations. To avoid the claim that the COMUDE reduces muni-
cipal autonomy, the mayor remains the head of the municipal council. 
The COMUDE now includes the mayor (who is the coordinator), 
council members, up to 20 COCODE representatives, public agency 
representatives who are in the municipality, and “representatives from 
local entities that are convened” (Article 11). The law also establishes 
“Second Level” COCODES in communities with more than twenty 
COCODES that are made up of members of the first level COCODES 
(Article 15).12 Again, details about the exact number of organizations 
that can be invited to participate in municipal, departmental, and 
regional councils are left up to local leaders and activists.
Interestingly, these laws did not engender the kind of backlash that 
the reformers experienced in the previous phase. Many interviewees 
noted that this law was not controversial because they reinstated almost 
the exact same system that existed before and with which the public 
was now familiar.13 Thus, the corporate council system continues to 
exist in Guatemala. The remaining part of this article explores two 
questions about the system: why did reformers choose this design and 
how effective has it been at meeting its goals? 
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Explaining the Emergence of Guatemala’s Top Down 
Participatory Reform
To understand the reasons behind the system design, we need to go 
back to the two phases that led to codification of the system: the 
constitutional process and the peace accords. First, why did national 
actors originally codify the development council system in the 1985 
Constitution? The answer is complex and political. During my field-
work several interviewees noted that the ideological foundations of the 
Christian Democratic party partly explain the system design. This party 
was founded in 1955 after the CIA- sponsored coup as an alternative 
to the extreme left and right. It had its ideological basis in a centrist 
movement that was taking place in many countries in Latin America 
and, according to interviewees, was influenced by European models of 
centrist parties as well. In principle, the party is committed to state-led 
development processes, democratic institutions, and complementing 
representative democracy with participatory democracy (Schlotter 
and Amaro 1970). Its intellectual founders, such as René de León 
Schlotter and Roberto Carpio (both high level officials during Cerezo’s 
administration) focused on imagining new ways to involve citizens 
in Guatemala’s development process. In a party document called El 
Reto de Desarrollo en Guatemala (The Challenge of Development in 
Guatemala), Schlotter and Amaro (1970, 10) write, “we have been 
developing our own idea related to the phases of development that we 
called ‘popular promotion.’ Popular promotion is considered to be the 
participation of the popular majority in development.” Nelson Amaro, 
who was also actively engaged in the party, sums up the party’s thinking 
when outlining three of the central factors lacking in Guatemala: 1) 
economic development; 2) adequate distribution of resources; and 3) 
citizen participation in decision-making (Amaro 1990, 37). Thus, a 
central tenant of the Christian Democratic party platform included 
increasing citizens influence in the public decision-making process, 
especially rural and indigenous poor.14 According to interviewees who 
were involved in the political party at the time, they took this idea to 
the constitutional assembly in order to institutionalize mechanisms 
of citizen participation in the new regime. 
The military pushed back when the civilian politicians presented this 
idea. Institutions that allowed rural and indigenous political partici-
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pation seemed too inviting for the leftist armed opposition. At the 
same time, the military was struggling to decide how to hand over the 
Inter-institutional Coordinators to civilians and how to avoid human 
rights prosecution. In private discussions an agreement emerged. An 
army official, quoted by Schirmer (1998), stated: 
A delegate of Vinicio Cerezo came to speak with me…I told 
him what we [the army] wanted; he told me what Cerezo 
wanted, and it seemed adequate, so we emitted the Executive 
Order in early 1986, in which the IICs and Poles of Develop-
ment were to be renamed Councils of Development…
Schirmer (1998) argues that this was acceptable to the military in 
part because Cerezo’s development vision—a top-down controlled 
development process—was similar to the military leaders’ who had 
set up the IIC system in the first place.  
Of course, the entire constitutional and subsequent electoral process 
was restricted to the “legal” parties (i.e. centrist and right wing), and 
no leftist political parties were allowed to participate. This allowed 
these two actors – the military at the CD—to dominate the process. 
The resulting development council system, therefore, suited both the 
military and the Christian Democrats’ interests. The IICs would be 
converted to civilian rule and renamed. The resulting system emerged 
as a controlled means of engaging some new actors in a narrow set of 
development decisions. 
As noted above, the system never took off due to the constitutional 
interpretation that the local council reduced municipal autonomy. It 
was not until the peace process, which rhetorically emphasized par-
ticipatory democracy, that the system regained strength. During the 
negotiations many social actors called for the need to reform municipal 
governance and increase means for citizen participation in the public 
sphere. Why did the negotiators decide to revive the council system 
instead of creating a new participatory institution?
Part of the response lies in pragmatics. Several interviewees noted that 
the system already existed in the constitution and reviving it did not 
necessitate a constitutional reform. Different parties also made prag-
matic decisions to “bet on” the system instead of creating a new one. 
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For example, one indigenous activist noted: “although we could have 
insisted on relying on traditional indigenous means of participation 
or creating new institutions, we bet on the council system, which still 
existed on paper, to increase our participation in politics.” 
At the same time, in a twist of fate, one of the key players from the 
Christian Democratic party in the 1980s, Amilcar Burgos, became a 
governmental representative in the negotiation process. He told me in 
an interview that he had been very involved in the original implemen-
tation process in the late 1980s and he wanted to “make sure that the 
system was in the peace accords.” He was able to do this because he 
was one of the very few governmental representatives that participa-
ted in the entire peace process, over six years and through a change of 
government. Thus, he was able to revive one of the central ideological 
tenants of the Christian Democrats’ party platform.
In sum, a combination of ideological, political, and pragmatic factors 
have led this unique system–top down in nature–to stay in place for 
almost 30 years. The next section explores the extent to which the 
development council system has been able to achieve its goals during 
this period of time. 
Results
How successful has the council system been? Is the system meeting its 
goals? Is the system effectively increasing civil society’s participation in 
policy making and/or improving development planning? This section 
explores these two questions in turn. 
1. Civil Society Participation? 
As noted earlier, one of the key goals of this system is to engage new 
actors in development decisions around the country. The law states 
the members of specific organizations have the right to participate. 
Citizens can form their own council at the community level, and local 
leaders convent councils at the higher levels. No restrictions on the 
number or percentage of participants exist. 
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To what extent are new actors successfully engaged in development 
policy planning? To determine this, it is useful to explore the nature 
of participation in each level of the council system.
CONADUR: National Urban and Rural Development Council
The National Development Council, meant to formulate national de-
velopment policies, is one of the weakest levels in the council system. 
For many years, the council rarely met. Official records do not exist, 
but scholars report that the CONADUR only met three times from 
1988 to 2001 (Gibson nd, Puente Alcarez and Linares López 2004). 
According to a more recent study, in 2006 President Berger called three 
ordinary meetings and one extraordinary, during which several com-
missions were set up and internal regulations were passed. However, 
because it was an election year, it never met in 2007. President Colom 
reactivated the national council in 2009 and held one meeting in 2009 
(Ramos Muñoz and Sosa Velásquez 2010). 
In an interview one government official explained the lack of meetings 
as a result of budget constraints. She noted that “holding national 
meetings is expensive, we have to pay for people to come from around 
the country.”  Irrespective of the lack of meetings, this council is heavily 
criticized by observers as lacking vision and failing to generate national 
debate (Ramos Muñez and Sosa Velásquez 2010). As one government 
official told me in an interview, “the CONADUR tends to approve 
national policies but then there is very little follow-up.”
Another problematic indicator is the fact that in the past, most pre-
sidents created parallel mechanisms for engaging citizens in national 
public policy debates. For example, President Portillo created an 
Intersectoral Dialogue Roundtable to discuss rural development and 
President Berger created “moving cabinets” which traveled around the 
country getting feedback and opinions and policy issues (Linares López 
2009). President Colom also created his own mechanism for consulting 
citizens about policy issues, called “Governing with the People.” This 
led Nelson Amaro (2008, 194) to declare that “[t]he highest levels 
of power do not see this structure as capable of resolving conflicts… 
instead of strengthening the system…the different administrations 
have created new agencies that live for four years.” 
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More recently, however, since 2012 under President Otto Pérez the 
national council has been meeting regularly. This reactivation is part of 
a national development planning process that is described later in this 
article. Thus, at least during the current presidential administration, 
the council system is meeting at its highest level and is undertaking 
some national development planning (see Morales 2014 and http://
www.scep.gob.gt/).
COREDES: Regional Councils
The regional level councils are tasked with formulating development 
and investment strategies at the regional levels and serving as a con-
duit between the department and national levels. The regional level 
councils are also very weak, which is mostly the result of the fact that 
regions themselves are not very important to the logic of the Guate-
malan state. As one member of the 1980 design team stated, “we were 
always uncomfortable about the regional level because it was hard to 
operationalize. There is no sense of the a ‘region’ in Guatemala, we 
sensed this from the beginning.”  Further, this level of council does 
not have an actual budget to distribute, because the 2002 reforms took 
away its original budget. In their study of the system, Ramos Muñoz 
and Sosa Velásquez (2010, 19) write that “[a]lthough they exist in all 
regions, they do not really function in practice…they do not meet the 
objectives, functions, and responsibilities that are stipulated in the 
law.” Thus, while councils exist in all regions and do meet, they are 
relatively inoperational.
Mandating Participation: Evaluating Guatemala’s Top-Down Participatory Governance System
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
0
110
Table One:  
Number of Department, Municipal, and Community Councils15
Council Level 2003 2006 2009 2011 2013 2014 (May)
CODEDES 
(out of 22 
Departments)
NA 22 22 22 22 22
COMUDES 
(out of 338 
Municipalities)
NA 286 296 300 334 126
COCODES 2802 12,819 14,68916 15,181 11,975 N/A
SOURCES: Author’s compilation using data from Ramos Muñez 
and Sosa Velásquez 2010, personal correspondence with SCEP and 
SEGEPLAN staff, SCEP’s online information (http://www.scep.gob.gt/), 
and SEGEPLAN’s Development Council Online System, SISCODE 
(http://sistemas.segeplan.gob.gt/siscodew/ddpgpl$modulo.indice).
CODEDES: Department Councils
The department level councils have a higher profile because they receive 
direct funding from the national government for municipal develop-
ment projects, also called investment projects.17 This led one observer 
to mention that “the CODODES are where the money is, this is where 
the real fighting takes place. They kill each other for project funding.” 
Most interviewees and scholars agree that the CODEDES do exist, as 
documented in Table One, and meet regularly (although not necessarily 
monthly which is the legal requirement). The CODEDES in each de-
partment is led by the governor and includes all departmental mayors. 
While civil society is represented, most of my interviewees noted that 
its participation is not very active. A 2009 study of civil society partici-
pation at this level found that 65% of the members of the CODEDES 
around the country were governmental officials. Again, this does not go 
against the letter of the law, which is silent about the number of civil 
society members, but does go against the spirit of getting more groups 
engaged in policy decisions.
There are several additional problems with the councils at this level. 
Ideally, the community councils (COCODES) would present projects 
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to the COMUDE and/or mayor, who would then take the proposals 
to the CODEDE for approval. However, several observers allege that 
projects are mostly hand picked by governors. Others noted that the 
projects are often contracted out to businesses with ties to the governor 
or his political allies (Linares López 2009). Interviewees also noted 
that some governors only fund projects for mayors who support their 
political party. Further, the congressperson from the district can change 
projects when congress reviews the final budget. All of these complaints 
led many interviewees to describe the CODEDES as spaces that have 
been co-opted by political forces, typified by clientelism, corruption, 
and political maneuvering.
A final critique of the CODEDES lies in the kinds of projects that 
are funded. There is a sense that most of the funding goes toward 
infrastructure projects, or what one interviewee called “grey projects” 
like roads, and are mostly urban in nature (Ramos Muñoz and Sosa 
Velásquez 2010). Research by Marroquín and de León (2011) on the 
list of public works funded through six departments from 2005 to 2010 
support this argument. They find that 52% of the amount spent by 
the CODEDES in these departments is spent on “grey” infrastruc-
ture projects. Thus, much of the development spending is centered 
on infrastructure and not targeting longer-term development goals.
COMUDES: Municipal Councils
The municipal level development councils are also currently functio-
ning in much of the country, as illustrated in Table One. However, 
two problems plague the COMUDES around the country: the lack 
of power to make funding decisions and the high level of power that 
mayors have over the council. In terms of the first problem, several 
interviewees noted that because there are no projects being funded at 
this level, the forum turns into an information session (see also Linares 
López 2009). Some have argued that this is partly due to the fact that 
the government representatives are more educated so civil society 
representatives do not speak up. Flores and Gómez-Sánchez’s (2010) 
research on the internal dynamics in six COMUDES in the northeast 
finds that while 90% of the community members had no more than 
an elementary education, 47% of the government representatives had 
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college degrees. As a result the governmental actors participate actively 
and involvement by the community is muted. In other words, internally 
the COMUDES demonstrate asymmetrical power relations.
COCODE: Community Councils
Data are hard to gather regarding the number and nature of COCO-
DES around the country. As the table above illustrates, by the end of 
2013, the best data available suggests that almost 12,000 groups of 
citizens had organized COCODES, which are formed when at least 
twelve citizens in a community elect members to participate in these 
councils. The implementation of the COCODES has varied around 
the country, and has strengths and weaknesses. Some of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the council system at the community level can 
be illustrated by the towns that I visited during my 2011 fieldwork. 
I observed several COCODE meetings in one zone of Ciudad Vieja, 
a medium-size city in the region of Sacatepequez. I also spoke to 
activists and COCODE members in several small towns around the 
municipality of Antiqua, which is part of the same region. The region, 
which lies in the center of Guatemala, is not typical of most regions 
in Guatemala in that it has a mostly urban, relatively homogenous 
mestizo population with tourism and farming making up its economy. 
However, these COCODES do appear to be relatively typical of the 
system’s varied experiences at the community level. 
COCODE in San Miguel de Escobar, Ciudad Vieja
San Miguel de Escobar is a poor community in Ciudad Vieja in the 
rolling hills of Guatemala. It is also home to a successful coffee coo-
perative in the area, Campesinos Unidos, partly assisted by a European 
NGO and run by local campesinos. Over the course of several visits to 
this community’s COCODE meetings, I realized that this particular 
COCODE is one of the more successful examples in the country. 
San Miguel’s COCODE formed in the aftermath of Hurricane Agatha 
in May 2011. In meetings with community groups and international 
donors, it became clear that the humanitarian assistance arriving to 
the city was not being distributed adequately. Further, community 
residents, who had witnessed the river rise in their zone of the city, 
creating a landslide that killed many of their neighbors, were angry 
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with the municipal government for ignoring infrastructure problems 
that could have prevented the deaths. Another NGO, based 30 minutes 
away in Antigua, suggested that they form a COCODE to pressure the 
mayor for some infrastructure changes. This NGO, Fundación Nahual, 
was working in other communities to form and train COCODES in 
partnership with the municipalities of Antiqua.
At the time of my visit, this COCODE met once a week and had 
between six and fifteen members present. Some meetings took on an 
educational nature – for example, the fire department chief visited to 
talk about emergency preparedness. Others were more political. Because 
I was there during the electoral season, the COCODE had invited each 
of the mayoral candidates to listen to their demands and present his (all 
candidates were male) proposal. The COCODE had written up a list 
of their development project priorities (including a health clinic and 
improved draining system for the river) in a formal letter. They asked 
each candidate to sign the letter and they would then take this promise 
back to the members of their respective groups. I was struck as the pre-
sident said to one of the candidates, “if you do win, we will be watching 
because we have the right to oversee your spending (fiscalizar).” 
The members of this COCODE meet regularly, have a list of projects 
that they are fighting for, and know that they can pressure for funding 
as well as monitor municipal spending. In some ways, then, this is a 
COCODE success story. However, members complained about a major 
challenge that they faced: the current mayor’s opposition to the group. 
Participants told me that the mayor did not attend meetings and “is 
not at all interested in the COCODE.” This seemed true despite the 
fact that the law states that the COMUDE, led by the mayor, should 
inform COCODES about budgetary issues and that the COCODE 
should present project proposals to the COMUDE (Articles 12 and 14 
of Decree 11-2002). They even complained about how hard it was to get 
the official COCODE seal—which made it a legal organization—from 
the mayor’s office. Thus, even this relatively successful COCODE had 
to overcome a lack of support from elected officials. 
COCODES in Communities Surrounding Antiqua
My discussions with community activists and COCODE members 
from smaller towns around the city of Antigua were not as positive as 
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my observation of the COCODE in San Miguel. Interviewees mentio-
ned several problems with their experiences. One problem is that fact 
that mayors would create parallel COCODES in the same community. 
In two communities, interviewees reported that community activists 
formed one COCODE and the mayor formed another with his own 
supporters. One person from San Juan del Obispo noted: 
We did everything as we should. We called an assembly and elected 
twelve representatives. Then, the municipal mayor chose another twel-
ve people and made them the official COCODE. One of the mayor’s 
relatives became the head of his COCODE and this was a way for him 
to get the projects (obras) that he wanted to be funded.
Another activist from San Pedro Las Huertas discussed a similar pro-
blem. In 2007, he and some community members formed a COCODE. 
He told me that “the mayor of Antigua did not like our COCODE 
because he wanted to do his own projects. So he created his own CO-
CODE. We had two for some time, one elected by the citizens and 
another approved by the mayor.” When I asked how this was possible, 
he responded “There is no oversight. Also there is a loophole in the 
law. The mayor could call this a second level COCODE and no one 
noticed.”  
Marcela Gereda, a Guatemalan journalist, published an opinion piece 
in early 2013 about the development councils that confirms these 
accounts. She writes (Gereda 2013): 
Over the last months I have been getting to know the logic of the 
Development Councils in the community atmosphere of the central 
altiplano. In this political culture that does not understand the functio-
ning of the council law, it is obvious that it will be difficult to see them 
become participatory and democratic….Observing these councils in 
the central altiplano I saw how the mayors “organize” the communities 
and invite them to participate to win votes. In this area (and perhaps 
in the entire country) clientelisitic politics based on godfather-like 
relationships (compadrazgo) and fear…many mayors, governors, and 
congresspeople…organize, for their own convenience, COCODES to 
serve as a political platform and to endorse projects that are mostly 
executed by businesses linked to political power…Meanwhile, little 
by little, communities lose autonomy and legitimacy.
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In sum, this discussion of the five council levels clearly demonstrates 
that there is variation around the country in terms of how effectively 
the system is engaging actors in policy planning. However, in terms 
of a net overall experience, most interviewees argued that the system 
has not effectively engaged new actors in decision-making processes. 
With some exceptions, the different councils are plagued by problems 
with funding, power dynamics, and clientelism. 
2. Development Planning
To what extent is the council system producing a cohesive development 
policy? Interviewee after interviewee told me that the development 
council system has failed to achieve this goal. For example, in their 
study of spending patterns Ramon Muñoz and Sosa Velasquez (2010, 
31) argue that “in general terms, the process of assigning, executing, 
and public investing through the development councils lacks syste-
matic criteria for accomplishing development.” The department level 
councils mostly fund projects and there is no overall sense of purpose to 
the logic behind them. Instead, they are often chosen based on political 
criteria. One interviewee, a scholar of municipal governments, told 
me that this is mostly “pork barrel politics.” Moving down the system, 
the municipal and community councils are not debating development 
policies either. Thus, as a general rule the system is not working towards 
strategic policy formulation and development planning. 
There is one exception. Under Colom’s administration, the gover-
nmental agency SEGEPLAN (which is tasked with overseeing all 
development planning) began a nation-wide processes to develop 
strategic plans at the municipal and department levels. In 2012, 321 
municipalities and 19 departments completed strategic plans that 
linked concrete program objectives to the Millennium Development 
Goals (SEGEPLAN 2012), for example.18  SEGEPLAN then analyzed 
the plans and began a national development dialog. This culminated 
in the “National Development Plan K’atun: Our Guatemala 2032,” 
passed in 2013, which is a 20 year development plan to work toward 
improving security, justice, and peace.  According to SEGEPLAN over 
18,000 people, representing COCODES, COMUDES, and other civil 
society organizations participated in the 2012 process (SEGEPLAN 
2012). As of March 2014, more than 13,000 people had participated 
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in consultations about the “National Development Plan K’atun” 
(Morales 2014). 
When undertaking this process, SEGEPLAN made a strategic decision 
to re-engage the development council system. Why did they decide to 
work through the relatively dormant councils? According to an official 
involved in the process, one of the objectives of the planning process 
was to engage citizens. She elaborated: 
One of our goals is to increase citizen participation in decision-making. 
At the same time, we did not want to recreate an instrument. Tell me, 
how many countries have the luxury of having the legal framework 
for citizen participation in place? It made sense to use that system to 
undertake this planning process. 
With the development planning process in place, the government now 
needs to fund projects that work towards those goals. 
Conclusion
When we look at the above evidence, it appears that the development 
council system is alive but not well in Guatemala. While it has had 
some successes, most scholars and interviewees agree that the coun-
cil system is not meeting its two goals (Linares López 2009). What 
factors are preventing a more successful experience with citizen and 
civil society participation in development planning? Interviewees and 
scholars point to several inter-related problems.
One problem lies in the complicated design of the council system. 
For example, analyst Luis Linares López (2009, 10) argues that the 
2002 trilogy of laws is not written in a cohesive way, writing that “[e]
ven though they were approved almost consecutively, there is little 
‘articulation’ between the three.” Further, two ministries oversee the 
system: SCEP and SEGEPLAN are both tasked with overseeing diffe-
rent aspects of the councils, which has led to the lack of coordination at 
best and competition at worst. Finally, the design has never been fully 
understood by the average citizen (Gibson nd). Having said that, very 
few scholars or interviewees signaled that this was the main problem. 
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Most indicated that the legal framework is sufficient, and although 
perhaps a few tweaks would improve it, new laws would not improve 
the system. The biggest obstacles to success in this case are additional 
deep-rooted, structural problems facing the country. 
The legacy of military rule is a second barrier to the system meeting its 
goals. This plays out in several ways. As Nelson Amaro argues (2001) 
the national governmental actors who designed this system never really 
wanted to empower poor, rural, indigenous people in Guatemala. It 
was a way to hand over the IICs to civilians without disrupting their 
work. He argues that early reformers inherently distrusted those who 
would participate and for that reason, it was never truly participatory 
in nature. Miguel Reyes Illescas (1998, 256), a former guerilla, agrees, 
stating that since Cerezo, “the decentralization and participation that 
the state apparatus stimulated was fundamentally oriented towards 
‘vertical’ participation, that is, towards the execution of infrastructure 
projects in conflict zones... local programs were converted into ele-
ments of the pacification policies.” Most citizens remember the IICs 
and associate them with the new councils. 
Further, many of my interviewees noted that, because of the war, 
average citizens fear getting involved in politics. In the past, political 
involvement by rural poor actors led to death and destruction. Thus, 
some actors, such as the indigenous, may fear the act of attending a 
meeting that is political in nature. At the same time, elected politicians, 
including mayors, tend to reinforce distrust and exclusion. Thus, the 
legacy of the military affects both the design and the political culture 
surrounding this institution.
Another structural problem at work includes a long tradition of cau-
dillismo, or strongman politics, and patron-client relations.  Several 
interviewees argued that this system only reinforces these traditions 
in Guatemala. For example, one scholar noted in an interview: “The 
COCODE and COMUDE have become a tool to politicize projects, 
the mayor can call his people and decide upon projects based on po-
litical goals. It is not a bad idea, it just became too politicized.” She 
went on to say that “the idea of the system is marvelous, but reformers 
left some holes that allow for clientelism.” Another noted, “the ma-
yors here like to be in charge, they are not going to let the community 
decide what to do.” An indigenous activist agreed, noting that “it has 
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become an instrument that is manipulated by the mayors.” Thus, the 
system is plagued by the same patterns of clientelism and caudillismo 
that typifies all political processes in Guatemala.
To conclude, this case provides insight into why reformers might opt 
for mandating participation as well as the factors that can impede the 
results after a top-down institution is passed. It suggests that institu-
tions that are primarily developed by national politicians in countries 
with traditions of violence, military rule, and strongman politics may 
not have a hard time overcoming the entrenched legacies that these 
traditions can leave in place.  On the other hand, the case also shows 
that, once created, these institutions will most likely stay around. To 
use a term commonly employed in the social sciences, they are “sticky.” 
This is worth remembering when we think about how many countries 
in Latin America have already set participatory institutions in top-down 
processes. Instead of eradicating the systems, the case suggests that 
reformers need to work hard to make these systems understandable 
and transparent so that the majority of citizens who continue to be 
left out of policy-making can effectively participate. 
NOTES
1. The author wishes to thank the American Association for University 
Women and Franklin and Marshall College for their financial support 
for this research. Thanks also to the editors of this special issue, two 
anonymous reviewers, and Kent Eaton for their helpful suggestions. 
2. For more on the spread of participatory budgeting see http://www.
participatorybudgeting.org/
3. For a copy of the 1985 Constitution see http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
parties/guate/leyes/constitucion.pdf . For a copy of Decree 52-87, 
see http://docs.costa-rica.justia.com/nacionales/leyes/decreto-no-
52-1987-sep-3-1987.pdf.
4. See Amaro 1990, 2001 and Reyes Illescas 1998 for more on constitu-
tional interpretation.
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5. Please note that the first law for his system called the lowest level the 
“local level” and the later 2002 law called it the “community level.” 
This change is explained in the following pages.
6. For a nice statement of the leftist position, see Reyes Illescas 1998. 
7. For more on the peace process see Brett and Delgado 2005, Holiday 
2000, Jonas 2000a and 2000b, and Sieder 1998. 
8. See Jonas 2000b and Ramos Muñoz and Sosa Velásquez 2010 for more 
on the substance of the accords. For the actual accords, see http://www.
guatemalaun.org/paz.cfm (Spanish and English). 
9. The VAT was raised again in 2002 to 12%, a portion of which also goes 
toward municipal spending and the CODODES (Decree 66-2002). 
10. For more on this agency, see http://www.scep.gob.gt/.
11. Congress later reformed the Municipal Code in 2010 (see Decree 
22-2010). 
12. See SCEP’s website for a description of the current system at http://
www.scep.gob.gt/
13. See Linares López 2009 for a more detailed analysis of the three laws 
and Marroquín and de León 2011 for more on the Law of Urban and 
Rural Development Councils.
14. For a leftist critique of this platform, see Reyes Illescas 1998. 
15. Because data are so scarce, come from varied sources, and are hard to 
verify, it is not clear why the number of COCODES increased then 
decreased over time. More accurate data collection would be needed 
to better understand these trends.  
16. According to Ramos Muñoz and Sosa Velásquez (2010), in 2009 there 
were 27,356 places with large enough population to have a COCODE.
17. See Ramos Muñoz and Sosa Velásquez 2010 for more on the sources 
of funding for development projects approved by the CODEDES as 
well as a more detailed analysis of funding patterns.
18. To review or download the actual plans, see http://www.segeplan.gob.
gt/2.0/ and click on “Planes de Desarrollo.” 
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AbstrAct
Mandating Participation: Evaluating Guatemala’s  
Top-Down Participatory Governance System
As Guatemala slowly emerged from its thirty-six year civil war, natio-
nal reformers created an interesting yet under-studied participatory 
institution—the Urban and Rural Development Council System. 
These councils are made up of civil society representatives who make 
decisions about and oversee development project spending and 
development policies. On paper, councils exist at the community, 
municipal, departmental, regional, and national levels of government. 
In practice, their existence and implementation varies greatly around 
the country. This article explores several aspects of this system, such 
as the institutional design of the council system, the origins of this 
design, and the system’s effectiveness in achieving its goals. The arti-
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cle argues that the system has engaged some actors but mostly failed 
to effectively channel interests and produce a participatory national 
development policy. This is mainly due to three factors: a complicated 
design, the legacy of military rule, and a political culture of clientelism 
and strongman politics (caudillismo). These findings serve to warn us 
that it may be more difficult to mandate citizen participation from 
above than many reformers currently assume.
resumen 
Participación obligatoria: evaluación del sistema de  
gobernanza participativa verticalista de Guatemala
A medida que Guatemala emergía lentamente de una guerra civil 
que duró treinta y seis años, los reformistas nacionales crearon una 
institución participativa que aún no ha sido analizada en profundidad: 
el Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural. Estos consejos están 
formados por representantes de la sociedad civil que toman decisiones 
sobre el gasto en proyectos de desarrollo y las políticas de desarrollo y 
los supervisan. Formalmente, hay consejos en los niveles de gobierno 
comunitario, municipal, departamental, regional y nacional. En la 
práctica, su existencia e implementación varía mucho en los distintos 
sectores del país. En este artículo se exploran distintos aspectos de este 
sistema, tales como el diseño institucional del sistema de consejos, los 
orígenes de este diseño y la efectividad del sistema en cuanto al logro 
de los objetivos que se plantea. Asimismo se postula que el sistema ha 
involucrado a algunos actores pero, en general, no ha logrado canalizar 
efectivamente los intereses y elaborar una política de desarrollo nacional 
participativa. Esto se debe principalmente a tres factores: su complicado 
diseño, el legado del gobierno militar y la cultura política de clientelismo 
y caudillismo. Estas conclusiones sirven de advertencia de que imponer 
la participación ciudadana puede ser más difícil de lo que muchos 
reformistas suponen en la actualidad. 
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Participação obrigatória: avaliação do sistema de governança 
participativa verticalista da Guatemala
À medida que a Guatemala emergia lentamente de uma guerra civil 
que durou 36 anos, os reformistas nacionais criaram uma instituição 
participativa que ainda não foi analisada em profundidade: o Conselho 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Urbano e Rural. Este sistema de 
conselhos é formado por representantes da sociedade civil que tomam 
decisões sobre políticas de desenvolvimento e gastos em projetos de 
desenvolvimento, além de supervisioná-los. Formalmente, há conselhos 
nos níveis de governo comunitário, municipal, departamental, regional 
e nacional. Na prática, sua existência e implementação variam muito 
nos distintos setores do país. Este artigo aborda diversos aspectos 
deste sistema de conselhos, tais como o seu desenho institucional, 
as origens deste desenho e a efetividade do sistema quanto ao 
alcance dos objetivos propostos. Também afirma que o sistema foi 
capaz de envolver alguns atores, mas, de modo geral, não conseguiu 
canalizar interesses de forma efetiva nem elaborar uma política de 
desenvolvimento nacional participativa. Isto se deve principalmente 
a três fatores: seu complicado desenho, o legado do governo militar 
e a cultura política de clientelismo e caudilhismo. Estas conclusões 
advertem para o fato de que impor a participação cidadã pode ser mais 
difícil do que muitos reformistas supõem na atualidade.
